Well-anchored inflation expectations have become a key indicator for the credibility of a central bank's inflation target. Since the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, the existence and the degree of de-anchoring of U.S. inflation expectations have been under debate. This paper introduces an encompassing time-varying parameter model to analyze the changing degree of U.S. inflation expectations anchoring. We confirm that inflation expectations have been partially de-anchored during the financial crisis. Yet, our results suggest that inflation expectations have been successfully reanchored ever since.
Introduction
Inflation expectations have become a major source of information about the credibility of a central bank and the appropriateness of its monetary policy stance. Anchoring inflation expectations at a level compatible with the central bank's inflation target is of particular importance. Central banks increasingly justify and explain their policy decisions based on the need to maintain well-anchored inflation expectations. Since the outbreak of the recent financial crisis, the (de-)anchoring of U.S. inflation expectations has been under debate.
Empirical results range from perfect anchoring with no crisis-effect, to a severe and persistent crisis-driven de-anchoring. The aim of the current paper is to reconcile the mixed evidence and to shed new light on the time-varying degree of anchorage of U.S. inflation expectations.
The empirical literature on the anchoring of inflation expectations is divided into two groups. The first strand of literature focuses on the level and the dynamics of inflation and inflation expectations. If deviations from the inflation target are small and short-lived, inflation expectations are seen as wellanchored, see e.g. Mehrotra and Yetman (2014) and Strohsal and Winkelmann (2015) . Specifically, when inflation expectations are well-anchored, the expectations should not depend on observed rates of inflation but only on the inflation target. According to Bomfim and Rudebusch (2000) , a significant impact of inflation on long-term inflation expectations would indicate a lack of credibility and a de-anchoring of expectations. Demertzis et al. (2012) conclude that U.S. long-term inflation expectations have been well-anchored in recent years, including the financial crisis, because they find that inflation expectations were not significantly affected by lagged rates of inflation.
Transitory economic developments with no implications for the long run may affect short-term but should not have any impact on well-anchored longterm inflation expectations. Therefore, a second strand of literature investigates how long-term inflation expectations respond to macroeconomic news (Beechey and Wright, 2009 , Gürkaynak et al., 2010a , Beechey et al., 2011 ) and short-term inflation expectations (Jochmann et al., 2010) . For the Euro area, Ehrmann et al. (2011) show that the introduction of the Euro led to a substantial increase in the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in the pre-crisis period, particularly in Italy and Spain. For the U.S., more recent contributions focusing on the effect of macroeconomic news suggest a de-anchoring of expectations since the outbreak of the financial crisis, see Galati et al. (2011) and Autrup and Grothe (2014) . According to the results of multiple endogenous break tests provided by Nautz and Strohsal (2015) , U.S. inflation expectations have not been re-anchored ever since.
In view of the contradictory results on the anchoring of U.S. inflation expectations, the current paper offers two contributions. First, so far, empirical studies have either accounted for the impact of lagged rates of inflation or for the role of news-driven short-term expectations. To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper considering both criteria jointly to assess the anchoring of inflation expectations. To avoid possibly misleading conclusions caused by ignoring an important source of de-anchoring, we combine the existing approaches to obtain a more complete picture of the determinants of long-term inflation expectations. Second, there is clear evidence that the degree of anchorage changes over time. Yet, irrespective of the strand of literature, empirical studies tend to assume an intrinsically constant degree of inflation expectations anchoring. Typically, the degree of anchorage is only allowed to have a sudden change in response to a regime shift. Jumps in the degree of anchorage are, however, not always a plausible description of monetary policy and of the dynamics of inflation expectations. In many situations, it seems more realistic to assume that the de-and re-anchoring of inflation expectations is continuously evolving. Note that constant parameter models with regime shifts can both under-and overestimate the empirical relevance of de-anchored inflation expectations. Suppose, for example, there is a brief but probably disconcerting period of de-anchoring.
In this case, a constant parameter model with endogenous regime shifts would either ignore the threat of de-anchoring completely if the critical period is too short to be detected, or if the de-anchoring is sufficiently strong the model will produce an extended period of de-anchoring that exaggerates the problem.
Therefore, in line with Demertzis et al. (2012) , our empirical analysis is based where the anchoring-parameter drops substantially below the value implied by perfect anchoring. This explains why constant parameter models with endogenous breaks tend to produce evidence in favor of an extended deanchoring period. Our results also clearly demonstrate that U.S. inflation ex-pectations only respond to short-term expectations and not to lagged inflation rates. This may explain why studies that exclusively focus on the de-anchoring potential of lagged inflation rates tend to underestimate the credibility problems of monetary policy stirred by the financial crisis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the determinants of inflation expectations and introduces the time-varying parameter model of expectations anchoring. The data are presented in Section 3. Section 4 shows the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
An Empirical Model of Inflation Expectations

Determinants of Long-Term Inflation Expectations
The Inflation Target A minimum requirement for effective central bank communication is that inflation expectations are -at least to some extentguided by the central bank's inflation target π * . In many countries, the announcement of inflation targets may have contributed to lower inflation rates, see Johnson (2003) . However, inflation targets do not have to be officially announced to be effective. Many central banks, including the ECB and the U.S.
Federal Reserve, do not publish official inflation targets (as the Bank of England does) but are nevertheless able to communicate the level of their longterm inflation objective to the markets. Over the last decades, it has become increasingly obvious that the Fed's long-run inflation target is very much in line with other central banks that focus on price-stability. In the following, we assume that the Fed's inflation target is constant at 2% in our sample period, i.e. from 2004 onwards. 1 The more credible the central bank's inflation target, the larger its role in expectations formation and, thus, the degree of anchorage of inflation expectations. In the limiting case of perfect anchorage, the inflation target should be the only relevant determinant of inflation expectations. In this case, any deviation of inflation from the target is seen as short-lived because markets are convinced that the central bank is able and willing to bring inflation back to target quickly. As a consequence, long-term inflation expectations π e l should remain particularly close to the target.
Past Inflation Unfortunately, the anchoring of inflation expectations might not always be perfect. The literature offers a number of explanations why inflation expectations may depend not only on the target for current and future inflation but also on the central bank's past inflation performance. If the credibility of the central bank's inflation target is imperfect, expectations formation incorporates learning from lagged inflation values, see e.g. Orphanides and Williams (2005) . Therefore, in accordance with Bomfim and Rudebusch (2000) , a significant impact of lagged inflation on long-term inflation expectations can be interpreted as lack of credibility and de-anchoring of inflation expectations. 
Short-Term Inflation Expectations
(De-)Anchoring of Inflation Expectations
To obtain a more complete picture of the determinants of inflation expectations, we combine the existing approaches to analyze expectations anchoring.
Building on Bomfim and Rudebusch (2000), we start with an equation where long-term inflation expectations π e l,t are a weighted average of the inflation target π * , lagged inflation π t−1 , and news-driven short-term inflation expectations π e s,t−1 :
When θ 2 = 0, short-term expectations play no role and inflation expectations only depend on the inflation target and lagged inflation. When θ 1 = 0, the impact of lagged inflation on the formation of long-term expectations can be ignored. Note that inflation expectations are perfectly anchored if θ 1 = θ 2 = 0 which implies that π e l,t = π * . Since we are particularly interested in the dynamics of inflation anchoring, we re-arrange the static level relation by subtracting π e l,t from both sides of equation (1) to obtain a dynamic adjustment equation of long-term inflation expectations:
This equation is easy to interpret and a straightforward generalization of the existing approaches employed in the empirical literature on inflation expectations anchoring. De-anchored long-term inflation expectations may follow actual inflation (θ 1 > 0), or news-driven short-term inflation expectations (θ 2 > 0). Put differently, the overall degree of anchoring and the speed of adjustment of long-term expectations to the target (1 − θ 1 − θ 2 ) is greater when the total impact of both sources of de-anchoring (θ 1 + θ 2 ) is small. Estimating the adjustment coefficients θ 1 and θ 2 reveals the relative importance of the sources of de-anchoring. Note that 1 − θ 1 − θ 2 can be interpreted as the degree of anchorage of inflation expectations. 8
Assessing the (De-)Anchoring of Inflation Expectations Across Time
Central bank credibility can be gained, but it also can be lost. As a consequence, the degree of inflation expectations anchoring might not be constant over time. The history of inflation in the U.S. clearly suggests that the degree of anchorage was lower during the Great Inflation of the sixties and seventies, than during the Great Moderation that ended with the outbreak of the recent financial crisis. The impact of the financial crisis and related monetary policy on the degree of anchorage is, however, less obvious. So far, the standard approach of the empirical literature to account for time-varying anchoring is simply to split the sample and to estimate a separate constant parameter model for each of the sub-samples, see e.g. Galati et al. (2011) and Autrup and Grothe (2014) . Nautz and Strohsal (2015) employ multiple endogenous break point tests to demonstrate that U.S. long-term inflation expectations respond to news and were, therefore, de-anchored by the crisis. Since there is no second break detected, they conclude that expectations have not been re-anchored ever since.
However, estimating the time-varying degree of inflation expectations anchoring using regime-dependent constant parameter models is not without problems. First, constant parameter models with regime-shifts assume that the intrinsically constant degree of anchorage suddenly changes to a new value.
However, regaining central bank credibility and re-anchoring inflation expectations might be a long and painful process where the degree of anchorage rises continuously over time. Particular in turbulent times, monetary policy requires a more flexible measure of expectations anchoring. Second, constant parameter models with endogenous break point tests require a minimum number of observations in each regime. For example, Nautz and Strohsal (2015) have to assume a minimum regime length of 6 months. As a consequence, this model is not designed to reveal shorter de-anchoring periods. Apparently, this inflexibility of constant parameter models may produce misleading results. Suppose, for example, the central bank responds quickly to a drop in the degree of anchorage and is able to re-anchor inflation expectations over the next few months. Although this scenario might be a realistic description of monetary policy in the aftermath of the Lehman crash, it cannot be captured by constant parameter models. In an empirical application, constant parameter models will either ignore the de-anchoring episode completely (because the risky de-anchoring period is less than 6 months) and therefore underestimate the danger of de-anchored inflation expectations, or the models will produce an extended but spurious period of de-anchoring that exaggerates the credibility problem of the central bank.
The natural solution to the above problems is a time-varying parameter (TVP) approach. Therefore, we adopt the standard TVP model representation 
Data
Inflation-linked securities have become an increasingly important source of information about expected inflation. Yields of index-linked and nominal bonds with equal maturities are used to derive the break-even inflation (BEI) rate,
i.e., the rate of inflation at which the payoff of the two types of bonds is equal.
In contrast to quarterly or even semi-annual surveys of expected inflation, BEI rates are readily available at high frequency and are therefore particularly suit- 
What Drives Inflation Expectations?
4.1. Inflation Expectations Anchoring: Results from a
Constant Parameter Model
In a first step, we assume that the degree of inflation expectations anchoring is constant during the sample period, i.e. from 2004 until the end of 2014. Table   1 summarizes the estimation results for the constant parameter model (2) However, this is not the whole story. In particular, irrespective of the expectation horizon, the estimated coefficient of short-term expectations (θ 2 ) is statistically significant and plausibly signed. Accordingly, the constant parameter model provides evidence against perfectly anchored inflation expectations.
The model suggests that the degree of anchorage has been 79% for long-term and about 64% for medium-term inflation expectations in each month from 2004 onwards. Thus, as expected, medium-term expectations are less anchored than longer-term expectations. This is also reflected in the test for joint significance of θ 1 and θ 2 , see Table 1 . (2) Notes: The figure refers to 5-year inflation expectations and shows the estimated anchoring parameter 1 − θ 1t − θ 2t (top figure) , the adjustment to past inflation θ 1t (middle figure) and the adjustment to short-term inflation expectations θ 2t (bottom figure) as solid black lines and the 95% confidence interval as dashed gray lines; cf. model (3).
In line with the literature, the time-varying parameter model confirms that medium-term inflation expectations are typically less anchored than long-term expectations. On the one hand, as can be seen from Table 2 , the average anchoring-parameter is only 87%. On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that (3) Our main findings on the (de-)anchoring of U.S. inflation expectations are summarized in Table 2 . The results show the benefits of a comprehensive and flexible approach to estimating the degree of expectations anchoring. Using a time-varying parameter model and considering both sources of de-anchoring jointly, our findings may reconcile the mixed evidence regarding inflation expectations anchoring in the U.S. On the one hand, the brief but nevertheless significant period of de-anchored inflation expectations stirred by the outbreak of the financial crisis confirms recent evidence on de-anchoring provided by studies relying on regressions with constant parameters, cf. Nautz and Strohsal (2015) . In contrast to constant parameter models with regime-shifts, the more flexible time-varying parameter approach is able to detect that monetary policy re-anchored inflation expectations rather quickly. On the other hand, even if a time-varying model is applied, the danger of de-anchored inflation expectations can be underestimated if one of the two sources of deanchoring is neglected, see Demertzis et al. (2012) . 
Conclusions
in state space form as follows ∆π e l,t = c t + Z t Θ t (8)
with Z t = ( π t−1 −π T π e s,t−1 −π T 1 ), Θ t = ( θ 1t θ 2t u t ) , c t = π T − π e l,t + βX t , d = ( 
where e t = ∆π e t − E(∆π e t |I t−1 ) and F t = Var(e t |I t−1 ) are the one-step ahead forecast error and its variance. The information set I t−1 contains all information available up to time t.
B. Complete Set of Estimation Results
We used the optimization algorithm of Berndt et al. (1974) to evaluate the likelihood. Convergence and parameter estimates remain almost unchanged when using other algorithms. The results presented in Table 3 imply that there is significant time variation of the parameters θ 1t and θ 2t . The Q-statistics indicate that almost no autocorrelation is left in the estimated forecast errors implying that the model is flexible enough to capture the dynamics of the underlying time series sufficiently well. ), exp(σ 2 ν )). Q(1), Q(2), Q(5) and Q(10) represent p-values of Q-tests for remaining autocorrelation in the standardized forecast errors.
